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COMMENT ON KENTUCKY DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES IN 1928
Studies heretofore made have been so well received that a
review and discussion of the 1928 decisions in criminal cases
Jave been undertaken by the writer and the Journal's readers
are to have the benefit of the work done and consideration given.
Co nPARAP vE TABL.E'
1916 1917 1922 1924 1928
Number of Appeals .. 103 85 174 231 141
Appeals by Defendant ..... 84 76 163 220 135
Affirmed .............................. ...... 48 57 86 127 79
Reversed ...... ......... 36 19 77 93 56
Appeals by Commonwealth .............. 19 9 11 11 6
Affirmed ....... .............. 9 4 8 7 --
Certifying Law .............................. 10 5 3 4 6
Homicide Appeals ...................................  41 47 67'
Affirmed ..........-.-. ...... 25 26 46
Reversed . .... .......... . 16 21 21
Liquor Appeals .. ..... .. 69 117 21
Affirmed . ...........................  . .... 28 70 5
Reversed ...................... ...  ..... 41 47 16
All other than Homicide or Liquor .. ...... ...... 53 56 46
A ffirm ed ----.-.--.-.------------.-.------.... .. .-  ..... . . 31 27
Reversed ................................... ..... .. .. 25 19
The object of the writer is the same as that expressed when
writing about the 1922 cases.
2
None of the a ffirmances will be referred to and many well
considered opinions will for brevity's sake be not included. No
attempt will be made to mention all of the reversed cases nor will
1 Taxation, condemnation, escheat and other Commonwealth cases
of a civil nature are not included herein.
The 1928 cases include all criminal cases decided by the Court of
Appeals during 1928 in so far as they have been reported in the South
Western Reporter up to and including Volume 10 (2d) No. 4.
The 1924 cases included all criminal cases decided by the Court of
Appeals during 1924, although some of the opinions now appear in the
early 1925 Advance Sheets. The 1916, 1917 and 1922 cases include
those only appearing in the Advance Sheets for those respective years,
regardless of when the decisions were handed down. It is believed
that the proportion is about the same.
2In discussing the cases herein the principles projected and the
comments interpolated are persuasive only and the idea is to challenge
the reader to investigate the adherence to or deviation from established
precedents to the end that a more 4fficient and adequate administration
of criminal jusice may result. Although the writer may be frank or
inquisitive he wishes to emphasize that he has the greatest respect for
our Honorable Court of Appeals and each and every member thereof.
See p. 117 of March, 1923, Kentucky Law Journal.
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aQ of the cases mentioned be thoroughly discussed-merely the
outstanding features emphasized.
Errors concerning evidence were the controlling or partial
reasons for reversal in thirty-one cases. These included incom-
petent evidence, insufficient evidence and verdict contrary to
evidence cases. Improper instructions in sixteen, defective in-
dictments in three, abuse of discretion of court in failing to
sustain motion for continuance two, misconduct of common-
wealth's attorney four, misconduct of judge one, and unconsti-
tutionality one.
A comparison of these figures with those submitted in the
discussion of the 1924 cases will show improvement.
The misconduct of the trial judge was held prejudicial in
Canterberry v. Commonweatl.3 It appeared that he on Novem-
ber 23d at 11 a. m. attempted to coerce the jury in a man-
slaughter case to make a verdict by saying that he would keep
the jury together until Saturday, December 4th. A verdict was
returned at 1:10 p. m. on the 23d.
The misconduct of the commonwealth's attorney caused the
reversal of Fleming v. Commonwealth.4 The prosecutor in his
argument discredited defendant's affidavit for a continuance,
which error was not cured at the close of argument by the
court's charge not to consider the comment where objection
during the argument was overruled. Similar misconduct in re-
ferring to "deposition of absent witnesses" as a mere affidavit
(where motion for continuance had been 'overruled) was like-
wise prejudicial.5
Arguing matters not in evidence was the prejudicial mis-
conduct causing reversal of a manslaughter conviction in Park
v. Commonwealth.6 In a murder prosecution, Maiden v. Com-
monwealth,7 it was error to admit evidence that accused pos-
sessed whiskey and had been indicted for another matter not
connected with the crime. The ease of Roames v. Common-
wealth8 is quoted giving the exception to the general rule that
2 222 Ky. 510, 1 (2d) S. W. 976.
'224 Ky. 176,5 (2d) S. W. 899.5Barnett v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 585, 9 (2d) S. W. 715 (Homi-
cide).
6 225 Ky. 340, 8 (2d) S. W. 422.
7 225 Ky. 671, 9 (2d) S. W. 1018.
a 164 Ky. 334, 175 S. W. 669.
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evidence of other offenses is inadmissible. An unique feature
of this case was that it was prosecuted exclusively by special
counsel, neither the commonwealth's attorney nor the county
attorney participating in the trial, But as no exception was
taken to this by accused it was not error.
A view -of the premises when the accused, was not present
caused the reversal of Freeman v. Commonwealth.9 As a view
is considered a part of the introduction of evidence against the
accused it is plain that a reversal was necessary.
A death penalty case, Jack v. Commonwealth,10 was re-
versed on account of the prejudicial error incident to the admis-
sion of the jailor's testimony that an ordinary magnifying glass
test showed that the fatal bullet was fired from the pistol in evi-
dence. A gripping opinion gives a more or less exhaustive dis-
sertation on "Forensic Ballistics" and refers to an article in
the November, 1927, issue of Popular Science Monthly. As this
is a technical matter the court properly holds that non-expert
conclusions are inadmissible until the witness shows he has made
a special study of the subject. The court suggests that instruc-
tions covering all phases, of the case be given upon the next trial
including self-defense and voluntary manslaughter.
There was no evidence of conspiracy in Roberts v. Com-
monweath-;1 1 hence it was error to instruct thereon. Modifica-
tion of the self-defense instruction by referring to provocation
was not supported by the evidence and was error itself necessi-
tating reversal. This case is another proving the dangerous use
of a "bringing-on-the-difficulty" instruction. Frasure v. Com-
monwealth1 2 is cited as giving a collection of authorities on in-
structions regarding murder, manslaughter and self-defense, to
gether with the proper limitations of the law.
Improper instructions also caused the reversal of Raines v.
Commonwealth.13 The court said "the omission of the word
'feloniously' from the instruction was not prejudicial .
but the omission of the word 'intentional' or 'wilful' or other
p226 Ky. 255, 10 (2d) S. W. 820.
222 Ky. 546, 1 (2d) S. W. 961.
"223 Ky. 305, 3 (2d) S. W. 647.
"169 Ky. 620, 185 S. W. 146.
226 Ky. 173, 10 (2d) S. W. 643.
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words of like import was ptejudicial." Suggestions for correct
instructions for the new trial are given.
Instructions on self-defense should, in particular cases,
not only give the accused the right of his own self-defense but
also for the defense of others. 14
A death conviction is reversed iA Mitchell et al. v. Common-
wealth15 on account of the prejudicial error of the court in
failure to sustain motion for a continuance. Here the homicide
was committed on the 24th day of the month, a special term was
called on the 26th, indictment returned on the 27th and the case
set for trial on the 30th; Many cases are cited upholding the
court's decision.
Hatcher v. Commonwealth G reverses a conviction for "ob-
taining property by false pretenses." An instruction setting
out defense that the payee agreed to hold the check until some
future day was not given. This was prejudicial error. Although
the defendant was indicted under Section 1208, Kentucky
Statutes, he was tried for the offense defined in Section 1213a
known as the "cold check" law (1914 Act). The cases of Gis-
son v. Commonwealth1" and Gominonwealth v. McCall.'s are
cited. The Grisson case was prosecuted under Section 1213a
for "drawing, uttering, delivering and presenting a check where
there were insufficient funds in the depository to meet the same."
The McCall indictment, like the Hatcher one, was for false pre-
tenses and the acquittal had under Section 1213a. The court
there held, "The mere giving a worthless check unaccompanied
by any false statement is not an offense under this section"
(1208). It is pointed out that under Section 1213a, "The of-
fense is complete when the worthless check is given with intent
to defraud, and the statute has pointed out the only way in which
this offense can be blotted out." The Hatcher opinion finds that
defendant was tried for the offense defined in Section 1213a,
(whereas the indictment was under Section 1208) and says, "If,
at the time he gave the check, he knew that he had no money on
deposit in the bank out of which it could be paid, and he obtained
"4Napier v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 384, 9 (2d) S. W. 107; Webster
v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 369, 3 (2d) S. W. 754.
225 Ky. 117, 7 (2d) S. W. 823.
"224 Ky. 131, 5 (2d) S. W. 882.
17181 Ky. 189, 203 S. W. 1075.
186 Ky. 301, 217 S. W. 109.
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goods from the payee named in the check, the offense was com-
plete when the worthless check was given with intent to de-
fraud." The meaning would be clearer if the words "with the
intent to defraud" were inserted also after the word "check"
is first used in the quotation. The proposition enunciated in the
quotation is applicable only to the cold check law and must not
be confounded with false pretenses generally, as in the latter
"the pretenses must be a false representation as to some past or
existing fact or circumstance, and not a mere expression of
opinion . . ."19 It is interesting to note that the Grisson
case is digested under Banks and Banking and the other two
cases are digested under False Pretenses. Attention is also
called to the fact that the Grisson indictment set out all the
statutory phases of the offense covered in the statute. The con-
viction under the indictment was affirmed and the court says,
"The indictment stated a public offense under the statute, and,
besides, was free from substantial error." This in spite of the
attitude of our Court of Appeals in recent years in holding such
indictments in liquor cases bad for duplicity.
20
The 1928 Cold Check Act which is now Section 1213a of the
1928 Supplement omits "with the intent to defraud." Persons
under twenty-one years of age are exempted from the provisions
of this 1928 Act. Query: Under what act will young men under
twenty-one and over seventeen be indicted and under what sec-
tion will they be tried for "cold checking?"
As the verdict was palpably against the weight of the evi-
dence in Webb v. Commonwealth,2' a rape conviction was re-
versed. The court said, "It can hardly be conceived that she
(the prosecutrix) did not consent to the sexual act." The de-
fense insisted that the court erred in not giving affirmative in-
struction for the defendant on his theory that the prosecutrix
voluntarily consented. The court holds this might have been
proper, but as the first instruction required the jury to believe
to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that the act was commit-
ted forcibly and without consent of the prosecutrix and a reason-
19 Clark 3d Ed. p. 62.
20 See Walker v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 257, 232 S. W. 617, and
other cases and authorities, including texts, cited by the writer in
Volume 11 Kentucky Law Journal, p. 121.31223 Ky. 424, 3 (2d) S. W. 1080.
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able doubt instruction was also given, the defendant's rights
were fully protected.
Because a somewhat similar instruction was not given "a
pistol conviction" was reversed in Avery v. Commonwealth.22
The jury chose to believe the evidence of one witness against
several others and found the appellant guilty. Although the
court holds that it was not necessary to instruct the jury as'to
the definition of what was meant by the word concealed, the
upper court "goes all the way" to Alabama to find what the
court considers the best definition of what is meant by carry-
ing a deadly weapon concealed, using some eighteen lifaes for
that purpose. Defendant claimed the pistol was in an automo-
bile and fell out when the door was opened. The prosecuting
witness claimed that when the pistol fell the defendant was some
eight feet from the automobile. Although -apparently the usual
"pistol instruction" was given the opinion holds that, "The
court should have admonished the jury upon the facts in this
case that appellant was not upon trial on a charge of having the
pistol concealed in the automobile, and that the jury should find
him guilty only in the event they believe in accordancewith the
instruction that he had the pistol concealed upon or about his
person as detailed by the witness for the Commonwealth." The
opinion contains this explanatory sentence, "We are not called
upon to decide in this case whether it would be a violation of the
statute for a man to have concealed a deadly weapon in his auto-
mobile in close proximity to his person and we must decline to
pass on that question." This is a -very interesting 'and rather
complete opinion, but it is difficult for the writer to see wherein
the substantial rights of defendant were prejudiced by failure
to give the admonishment as indicated therein.
The whole court properly sat when determining the consti-
tutionality of Section 4243a1-3 providing for the cutting of
weeds and similar obstructions along the highway. A demurrer
-had been sustained to the indictment and the indictment dis-
missed on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. In
,ormonwealth v. Watso=23 the statute is held. to be not uncon-
stitutional as discriminatory or taking property for public use
= 223 Ky. 248, 3 (2d) S. W. 624.
" 223 Ky. 427, 3 (2d) S. W. 1077.
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without due compensation. Similar duties, such as the duty to
work the road, to assist an officer in the performance of his duty,
or to permit the destruction of one's property when circum-
stances require it, commanded by statutes providing for like
hardships, have been held valid. The Washington Supreme
Court upheld an act requiring the owner of land abutting on the
highway to cut weeds growing upon the highway and made the
costs thereof a lien on his land.24 All that remains now is for
the weed law to be enforced.
A negro was held to be entitled to a peremptory instruction
on a charge of detaining a woman against her will.25 Just how
this prosecution reached the appellate court is difficult to under-
stand in view of the failure of the record to show any evidence
of detention whatever. While the conduct of the accused in.
walking along the street at 6:30 a. m. with his person exposed
was most reprehensible there was no more attempt on his part
to detain the prosecutrix than the other three ladies accompany-
ing her, and there was none as to any. The late Tinsley case,26
where the authorities are collected, is cited and the court fit-
tingly says, "An examination of these authorities will show that
in each instance the defendant was guilty of some overt act cal-
culated to detain the woman either by obstructing her free move-
ments, placing her in fear, or by threats of some nature which
were calculated to interfere with the exercise of her own free
.will."2
A two-year seduction conviction is reversed in Dalton v.
Commonwealt 2 7 because evidence in chief for the Common-
wealth was admitted after defendant had concluded his evi-
dence. The opinion admits that the trial court has wide dis-
cretion in such matters, citing cases to support that doctrine, but
holds that the instant case is in fact an abuse of the discretion
of the trial court, but as the evidence was incompetent and cer-
tainly prejudicial the reversal is made on that ground rather
than the abuse of the trial court's discretion. As considerable
evidence was admitted relating to the pregnancy of the prose-
Northern Pac. R?. Co, v. aam County, 78 Wash. 51. 138 Pac. 307,
51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 274.
21 Pardue v. Co'mmonwealth, 224 Ky. 783, 7 (2d) S. W. 211.
2 220 Ky. 121, 300 S. W. 368.
"226 Ky. 127, 10 (2d) S. W. 609.
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cutrix and regarding the birth of a child the court admonishes
that on another trial such evidence should not be allowed, citing
in support thereof Jordan v. Commonwealth.
28
Another seduction conviction in which the punishment was
fixed at one year, Curry v. Commonwealtlb,29 was reversed on
account of the trial court's failure to allow cross-examination of
prosecutrix to develop pertinent evidence tending to contradict
her statements at the trial with those theretofore made. While.
the Jordan case is not cited in the Curry opinion, nevertheless
"the court had a trying experience and this resulted in some
confusion in the rulings, one instance of which is that on the
final argument the commonwealth's attorney insisted upon dis-
cussing the birth of prosecutrix's baby, claiming this had been
admitted in the evidence, until he was corrected by the court."
One witness had testified to seeing prosecutrix and another
young man together "about two months before her baby was
born." This evidence, according to the opinion, was apparently
withdrawn.
Granting that the Jordan opinion is sound in so far as it
holds that "It was manifestly prejudicial error to permit the
Commonwealth to exhibit before the jury a child young as this
one was, for no other purpose than to excite the sympathy of the
jury . . ," nevertheless it is difficult for the writer to sup-
port the proposition that evidence as to whether prosecutrix
became pregnant or a child was born is not relevant or admis-
sible to corroborate prosecutrix. The seduction statute provides
punishment for one who "under promise of marriage, (shall)
seduce and have carnal knowledge of any female under twenty-
one years of age, and he shall be guilty of a felony." The writer
can think of nothing more conclusive as to a young unmarried
woman's having had carnal knowledge with some one than the
fact that she became pregnant and gave birth to a child. If such
evidence is competent in a rape case,80 a fortiori such evidence
should be permitted in seduction where, if proven, it is evident
that there was complete sexual surrender and much more prob-
ability of conception.
28180 Ky. 379, 202 S. W. 896, 1 A. L. R. 617.
- 225 Ky. 261, 8 (2d) S. W. 386.
30Draft v. Coramonwealth, 124 S. W. 856.
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As to whether or not a witness is an accomplice the jury is
to decide under certain circumstances and the court's failure to
instruct the jury in regard thereto is the reversible error in
Fryman v. Commonweathal (transporting liquor), the court
continuing to adhere to the Stringer dobtrine3 2 wherein the
court holds that there are accomplices in misdemeanors and that
Section 241 of the Criminal Code is applicable to both misde-
meanors and felonies.
Two convictions for violation of the liquor law and former
conviction thereunder were reversed. In Billings v. Common-
wealth,,sa the reversible error was failure to submit the question
whether the defendant was exceeding the speed limit when ar-
rested without a warrant as that feature really determined the
admissibility of evidence regarding the liquor found. Trial court
assumed that in the presence of the officers the defendant was
running his automobile when arrested at a greater speed. than
allowed by law, whereas that issue chould have gone to the jury.
The incriminatory evidence introduced would have been prop-
erly admissible only in the event that an offense was being com-
mitted in the presence of the officers at the time of accused's
transporting of thsliquors. The opinion is elaborate, Wigmore,
Chamberlayne, Greenleaf and the Harvard Law Review being
cited, showing that great confusion has been created on this poinf
as well as contrariety of opinions. The authors of the law re-
view article conclude, "The considerations discussed are
abstruse and difficult," and doubt is expressed as to
whether they have "sufficient practical value to make the dis-
cussion worth while except as a form of mental exercise." Never-
theless an ordinary circuit court judge in Kentucky is supposed
apparently to know these niceties of the law sufficiently to prop-
erly instruct his jury and rule on the admissibility of evidence.
As the trial court in the Billings case seemed lacking in this par-
ticular, the case *as reversed.
The error in the three-year conviction of Pruett v. Common-
wealth34 is more patent. To convict one of manufacturing in-
toxicating liquor it must appear that he had. theretofore been
U1225 Ky. 808, 10 (2d) S. W. 302.
- 195 Ky. 716, 243 S. W. 944.
223 Ky. 381, 3 (2d) S. W. 770.
" 225 Ky. 665, 9 (2d) S. W. 984.
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convicted of unlawful manufacture, whereas Pruett's former
conviction was under a blanket indictment charging "unlaw-
fully manufacturing, selling, giving away, keeping to sell, and
having in possession and transporting, spirituous, vinous and
intoxicating liquor. . . ." Although defendant confessed to
a fine which waa imposed by the court on the blanket indict-
ment, he had failed to plead guilty to any specific violation.
Under Section 3 of the Rash-Gullion Act and the decisions of
the court regarding blanket indictments in liquor cases the re-
versal was imperative. Another felony conviction was reversed
because the evidence failed to show that the former conviction
was for an offense committed after March 22, 1922, when the
Rash-Gullion Act became effective.35
An old friend of the court showed up when appellant in
Keifner v. Commonwealth 0 appeared, for the court admits
"appellant bears a bad reputation for illicit dealing in liquor
and his name is a familiar one in our courts" (citing other ap-
peals by appellant). Apparently only a small amount of white
whiskey was found "in a toilet room," according, to the state-
ment made by a woman employee who had the liquor in her
hands. The court holds that an instruction should have been,
given in substance that if the whiskey was on appellant's prop-
erty without his knowledge or consent and not by his direction
or authority he was not in the unlawful possession of the whiskey
and should be acquitted. It is doubtful in the writer's mind
whether this sort of "self-defense instruction" is either proper
or necessary if the usual liquor instructions are given.
The report of a grand jury read in the presence of the trial
jury at the psychological moment during the lower court trial of
Miller v. Commonweat . 7 was the fatal error. The report
lamented the inquisitorial belief that, "The liquor sellers are not
content to merely violate this law but are going further, and
attempting to, and are, having witnesses summoned before this
body, and in the trial of cases perjure themselves." Other simi-
lar comments were made in the report urging "determined
opposition by all good citizens." The higher court holds that
there is no difference in principle between this case and Shaul
"Hardy v. Commonweath, 224 Ky. 540, 6 (2d) S. W. 689.
225 Ky. 160, 7 (2d) S. W. 1066.
225 Ky. 744, 9 (2d) S. W. 1088.
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v. Commonwealth,33 in which the trial judge, in impanelling his
petit jurors and just after their selection for service during the
term, said to them, "It was their duty in all trials for violations
of the liquor law to disregard the evidence of the accused as un-
worthy of belief." The whole court sat in the case and there
is no dissenting opinion. Circuit judges, grand juries and com-
monwealth's attorneys will take due notice and govern them-
selves accordingly.
Another fatally defective indictment was the cause for re-
versal in Middleton v. Commonwealth.s 9 The accusative portion
alleged the name of the purchaser of the intoxicating liquor, but
the descriptive portion did, not. The court cites Deaton v. Com-
monwealth40 to support the opinion.
A father's alleged incompetency should have been made a
question for the jury, otherwise his consent to search land he
owned on which his sons were tenants did not bind the sons who
were in charge of the place living with their father. Conse-
quently the evidence qs a result of this search so consented to
was incompeteut and improper as there was no search warrant.
There was proof available that the father had paralysis which
had affected him mentally as well as physically and that the
sheriff would say thao he was decrepit and in poor health and in
poor condition. The court excluded all of the testimony as to the
mental condition of the elder Gilliland and declined to instruct
the jury with reference thereto. In reversing this case the court
says, inter alia:-
"It might not be amiss to add that it Is with some reluctance that
we fAnd ourselves compelled to reverse the judgment, since there was
abundant evidence to establish the defendants' guilt; but it is the duty
of courts and officers to obey and observe 'mandatory requirements of
the Constitution, and there is no provision in it more sacred to the
individual, nor which the founders of our constitutional form of govern-
ment more highly cherished, or for which they more strenuously con-
tended, than the one upholding the right of the people to security In
their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable search
and seizure, and which is contained in Section 10 of our Constitution.!' "
The wife jointly was indicted with her husband for possess-
ing apparatus for manufacturing liquors and convicted. The
verdict called for a $300.00 fine and a thirty-day imprisonment
206 Ky. 781, 268 S. W. 550.
226 Ky. 220, 10 (2d) S. W. 812.
220 Ky. 343, 295 4. W. 167.
Gilliland, v. Oomronwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 (2d) S. W. 467.
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sentence. The court believed the husband undoubtedly to be
guilty. It said:
"We do not believe that the punishment of the actual violator, or
the benefits from a vigilant enforcement of the law, requires or demands
the raising of any presumption of guilt against the wife under such a
state of fact. Of course, we do not mean to hold that a married woman
can not commit the offense under consideration, or similar ones, but we
do declare her conviction must be sustained by something with more
probative force, and of more tendency to convict, than the mere infer-
ence to be drawn from the fact of her being the wife of a husband with
whom she resides in the household where the contraband goods were
discovered." ,*
A conviction for unlawful possession was reversed in
Kohaer v. Commonwealth,4 3 on account of incompetent evidence
having been introduced; county patrolmen presuming to execute
an order of delivery gave evidence concerning the liquor. As
they are only authorized to make arrests and searches and
seizures, the evidence as to the offense against the prohibition
law committed in their presence was, under the Youman case,44
cited by the court, incompetent. The court emphasizes that a
motion for a peremptory instruction brings into question the suf-
ficiency of the evidence and not the competency of the witnesses.
The court insists that the Commonwealth's theory of the alleged
competency of the evidence on account of its being committed in
the presence of these witnesses (officials) is not tenable because
the "presence of the officers in defendant's dwelling was the very
thing that was unlawful in this case."
The same doctrine was applied in Harvey v. Common-
wealth,45 where a conviction for selling liquor was reversed be-
cause of insufficiency of affidavit for a search warrant issued by a
police judge. It is pointed out that if the affidavit for the issu-
ance of a search warrant is oral merely, it will be presumed to
be all right, but if written it is subject to the most penetrating
scrutiny. The court also refuses to say that an insufficient affi-
davit for a search warrant might not be amended after the search
warrant is issued. This is riather interesting. Emphasis is made
that the "ultimate fact of guilt should be stated in the affidavit."
It is peculiar to the laity that a search warrant would be deemed
necessary in a case where the "ultimate fact of guilt" was
Gulett v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 194, 7 (2d) S. W. 1050.
222 Ky. 671, 1 (2d) S. W. 1072.
193 Ky. 536, 237 S. W. 6.
"226 Ky. 36, 10 (2d) S. W. 471.
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known and sworn to. A warrant for the arrest of the defendant
without any search could then be instituted and a conviction had
without wasting time with a search and putting the officers to
that extra trouble. The answer to this, of course, is that there
would be difficulty in convicting a liquor violator on evidence
of one ma i and it would require corroboration and the liquor,
if seized lawfully, would be conclusive corroboration.
The Youman doctrine has been subject to considerable criti-
cism and its alleged unsoundness challenged in the Kentucky
Law Journal. 46 Considerable of its "wetness" was "dried up"
by the affirmance of KendaZl v. Commonwealth4T and Chapman
v. Commonwealth,4s under which such evidence may be admitted
if given by private citizens, but inadmissible if from officers.
A state organization's letter asking more co-operation on
the part of the county attorneys when assembled in annual con-
vention in December, 1928, provoked a reply in part as follows:
"We wish to direct your attention to another and perhaps greater
hindrance to the enforcement of all laws and particularly the liquor
laws of our State and Nation. It is the principle established recently
by our Court of Appeals to the effect that any evidence obtained by an
illegal search or in any illegal way is inadmissible and can not be used
against the accused.
"By the establIshiaW of this principle in Kentucky, we have de-
parted from the well-nigh universal rule to the contrary, not more than
four or five courts in our United States agreeing with our Court of
Appeals.
"It is said by one of our most distinguished authorities on Evi-
dence, Professor Wigmore, that 'such a rule is misguided sentimentality.
For the sake of indirectly and contingently protecting the Fourth
Amendment (of the United States Constitution) this view appears
indifferent to the direct and immediate result, viz.: of making Justice
inefficient and coddling the criminal classes of the population. It puts
supreme courts in the position of assisting to undermine the foundations
of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the
overzealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community
than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.' (4 Wig. on
Evidence 637, Sec. 2184.)."
The able dissenting opinion of Judge McCandless (now
'Chief Justice) in Morse v. Commonwealth4A9 is somewhat along




'a Vol. 11, p. 124 et seq.
47 202 Ky. 169, 259 S. W. 71.
"206 Ky. 439, 267 S. W. 181; see 14 Ky. Law Journal 133.
204 Ky. 672, 265 S. W. 37.
